"The Opinion and the Other Opinion"

Of all of this week's readings, I found "The Public Diplomacy of Al Jazeera" especially interesting. I freely admit that prior to this course, I knew next to nothing about Al Jazeera, save for the fact that they broadcast messages from bin Laden after 9/11. I feel like we've been building up to a more in-depth discussion of the news network all semester, and this piece by Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa brought up many relevant points and got me thinking about the role of news media in the Arab world, especially in comparison to news media in Western society.

I appreciated the authors' brief history of Al Jazeera--its inception in 1996 with (very) generous funding from an emir in Qatar, its debut on the world stage in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, and its promotion to lead player in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, when it was the only transnational news organization with a bureau in Kabul. They also identify the internal and external focuses of Al Jazeera: internally pushing the envelope by spotlighting on controversial subjects like sex, corruption and politics, and externally focusing on regional and world events from the Arab and Muslim perspectives. Both of these have of course caused various uproars in the Middle East and in the rest of the world, particularly the West. Government leaders in the former (Saudi Arabia for example) have blocked Al Jazeera in some cases because of its dynamic internal content, seeing it as a threat to their authority. In the West, meanwhile, especially in the United States, the network's internal programming is supported, since it's viewed as supporting the ideals of democracy and free speech. But its external programming--the bin Laden broadcasts, and showing the negative human effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts--has caused much consternation and outrage.

Powers' and Gilboa's outlining of Al Jazeera's dual focus segues nicely into their next point, which was for me the most important and most vital to comprehending the network: Al Jazeera has a definite political agenda. There are a couple of reasons for this, according to the authors. First, the national media systems in the Middle East leave much to be desired. They are marred by corruption, as they are controlled by government regimes and do not even attempt to present a balanced account of domestic and regional events. Al Jazeera looks to fill this void by providing a counterpoint, and in doing so takes a stand against the corrupt political establishment. It also challenges the notion of the nation-state "as the primary actor in international affairs," which we've discussed at length earlier in the semester. This is somewhat ironic considering that the Qatari government still pours money into Al Jazeera, but I think it proves the network's mission of presenting an independent voice and acting as an advocate for Arabs, no matter the monetary or political cost.

Powers and Gilboa aptly contrast Al Jazeera with its Western counterpart, CNN. They speak of the now-familiar "CNN effect" and address the natural next question: is there also an "Al Jazeera effect?" I think after reading the piece that comparing the two would be ultimately futile because they operate in such different environments. In Al Jazeera's case, as the authors point out, it is not just there to report events objectively but also, in view of the political climate in the Middle East, "...to take over the tasks that are usually fulfilled by political parties." It is not just a news network--to say so would be quite an understatement. Al Jazeera is there also to effect change in the region through its programming and above all to be "an agent for democratic governance." This piece certainly gave me a greater understanding of this media organization and also made me realize the degree to which it's misunderstood in the United States. I'm not saying I'm going to replace my cable news network of choice with Al Jazeera English, but I will no longer dismiss it as irrelevant either.

Soft power, public diplomacy and technology...what next?

I liked this week’s readings because I found that for the first time actually understand what soft power is and the role it plays in the field of public diplomacy. Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion and payment”. He goes on to say, “A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies”. In essence soft power is the attempt to promote a country’s culture and values to the public in foreign countries, and hopefully create a positive image and understanding, so foreigners will be more willing to help and support that country’s policies.

Joseph Nye in his reading, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, mentions how the United States had a very good handle on the use of soft power during the cold war, but after it, its soft power initiatives began to decline because of the thought for its lack of importance. Many people thought soft power was merely a war tactic, and after the war well we had no use for it, so many cuts were made in programs, such as educational exchanges. The author also points out that the efforts for soft power after 9/11 have not been the best or the most successful.

Public diplomacy helps disseminate soft power efforts through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, and arranging exchanges. Soft power is divulged through many types of mediums, such as: television, internet, radio, and actual face-to-face interaction. The export of television shows and Hollywood movies has a great impact on how foreigners view American culture, but it is a one way flow of information as are too the radio and usually the internet. Although the internet is capable of providing feedback, it can’t really substitute a face-to-face interaction. The mutual understanding of each other’s culture gives way to a stronger relationship and provides know-how on how to promote one’s culture elsewhere considering different values and customs.

In talking about the internet and face-to-face interaction, it is important to mention the Public Diplomacy 2.0 (PD 2.0) approach which James Glassman describes in his speech, “Public Diplomacy 2.0”. He first emphasizes that PD 2.0 is not a new technology; it is an approach to public diplomacy which uses social networking technologies to its advantage and in keeping up with the changing information age. The Internet today is based on interactivity and conversation; it is a democratic virtual world. There are so many sources of information if you don’t trust one go to another source, or read through many sources and then make your own informed decisions. PD 2.0 initiatives include the use of blogs, websites, webchats, social networking sites, virtual worlds, etc. I found an example Glassman gives particularly interesting, that in Columbia a young man started a facebook group called, One Million Voices Against the FARC, which is a terrorist group, and got 400,000 members and the group got 12 million people around the world to participate in an activity where they all took to the streets. I remember in one of my classes someone had pointed out how influential can becoming a member of a facebook group actually be? This example shows exactly how influential it can be and how it can make a difference. Finally, the integration of new technologies into public diplomacy and soft power efforts can be very beneficial, especially in our constantly changing world. Initiatives must keep up with the changes, for them to be effective.

"Democracy Is..." Winners

In case you were curious about the winners of the "Democracy Is..." video contest mentioned in the James Glassman article, check them out here. Who knew Democracy was like a smoothie?

The United States war on Al Jazeera

I found The Public Diplomacy of Al Jazeera by Shawn Powers and Eytan Gilboa as well as Public Diplomacy and Soft Power by Joseph Nye especially enlightening this week as we have continued to discuss both concepts frequently in class. What I discovered in these readings just served to enhance what I already knew; The United States does not have it's act together when it comes to approaching public diplomacy, soft power, and the rising political power of Al Jazeera in the Middle East.

Al Jazeera is viewed positively by its target audience - Arabs and Muslims throughout the region of the Middle East, most likely because the network attempts to create a feeling of "Pan Arab" citizenry across borders that has never been achieved. Regardless of pressures by surrounding regimes, who criticize the news outlet for inciting violence, encouraging dissent, and reporting on "taboo" topics; the relatively new media source was recognized as the fifth most popular "brand" in the world. Obviously, Al Jazeera is doing something right to achieve this status. As the network continues to be attacked by governments in the Middle East, this only serves to increase its credibility and popularity. One would think the United States would have learned this lesson in watching its Arab counterparts attempt to shut the network down, to no avail. Led by the Bush Administration as well as various agencies and departments, Al Jazeera was labeled "Osama's mouthpiece", accused of inciting terrorists activities, and inaccurately protraying the war in Iraq. These criticisms have only served to increase the popularity of the network and lessen the amount of influence the US may hope to have in the region through soft power and public diplomacy efforts.

Joseph Nye defines soft power as " the ability to shape the preferences of others" and public diplomacy as the instruments governments use to spread soft power. Soft power is dependent upon three objectives: culture, political values, and foreign policies. The US attempts to "win the hearts and minds" of people in the Middle East through these tactics. What the US fails to notice is that actions speak louder than words when it comes to soft power. Nye discusses how in the new information age, everyone has access to so much information that people are experiencing information overload and need to decide for themselves what is going to receive their attention. No matter how much the US talks and talks or continues to criticize Al Jazzera, this only serves to decrease our own credibility and increase that of the only network many in the Middle East view as a legitimate and independent source of news. With websites, such as www.stopaljazeera.org that label Al Jazeera to be a form of terror television and a new form of hate America media, the US government is doing exactly what its counterparts in the Middle East regimes do - attempt to prohibit an outside, independent source from reporting the news. This branding of the station as anti-American has increased due to the broadcasting of Al Jazeera English.

Al Jazeera's English website describes its goals: "Al Jazeera English is destined to be the English-language channel of reference for Middle Eastern events, balancing the current typical information flow by reporting from the developing world back to the West and from the southern to the northern hemisphere...the channel aims to give voice to untold stories, promote debate, and challenge established perceptions". If the United States wanted to effectively use its soft power and increase its relevancy through public diplomacy, it would smartly use this media source as a chance to counteract the negative reporting against the United States and its foreign policy actions, particularly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nye believes that in order for public diplomacy to be successful, the US needs to know its target audience. The consumers of Al Jazeera English are the exact audience that we need to be targeting. As Nye further states, "It is sometimes domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that are critical of its own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility...When the government instruments avoid such criticism, they not only diminish their own credibility but also fail to capitalize on an important source of attraction".

While I am in no way defending Al Jazeera's actions (I actually find fault with them for claiming to "set the agenda" as well as their statements that they are not always a neutral source of information), I recognize the power they have as a brand, a news source, and as a political actor. They have managed to do significant damage to the United States goals abroad, but this could have been mediated by the United States own involvement on the network to counteract their charges. Further, CNN and Fox News, as well as other domestic sources that provide our information make use of stories and video released by Al Jazeera. Also, the videos shown (especially those released by Bin Laden) allow government officials to analyze the true dates the videos were released and the location of where they formed. If used effectively, I believe the US could actually use Al Jazeera, specifically Al Jazeera English, to rebuild our soft power in the region and even use them as a potential source in fighting the war on terror.

Sources:
http://www.stopaljazeera.org/
http://english.aljazeera.net/aboutus/2006/11/2008525185555444449.html

September 12, 2001

This week we have another interesting set of readings that focus on the role of media during conflict and peace. Specifically, the readings detail the role media and technology play in influencing political leaders and setting the foreign policy agenda. Robin Brown’s article, “Spinning the War,” focuses on the presentation of international events, in particular, ‘The War Against Terror.’ In the article, Brown discusses “the difficulty in trying to craft and communicate a message in an increasingly complex and competitive trans national media environment.”

This immediately reminded me of a great exhibit at the Newseum in D.C. called the 9/11 Gallery. The Gallery features front pages from newspapers around the globe on September 12, 2001. In Brown’s article, she describes how in the wake of 11 September 2001, the US could have portrayed the 9/11 attacks as either a “criminal or terrorist action,” or “it could [have used] the language of war.” However, without a definitive approach from the Administration in how to frame the attacks in President Bush’s evening speech on September 11^th, each newspaper had the liberty to frame the events of September 11^th in any manner they liked.

Being a former member of my collegiate newspaper, I’m sure newspapers carefully considered how they would word their headlines for their September 12^th editions. As you can see from the Newseum exhibit, some of the papers chose to key in on specific war language from President Bush’s speech. The use of phrases such as “act of war,” perpetuated the portrayal of the attacks as war as opposed to criminal or terrorist attacks. However, ultimately due to the Bush Administration leaving the portrayal of the attacks open to interpretation, the media was able to frame the war in its early stages.

http://www.newseum.org/todaysfrontpages/default_archive.asp?fpArchive=091201

“War on Terrorism”, more like Scare the people!

Through the media politicians, policymakers, organizations, and governments in general shape the perception of the audience in terms of a specific event or situation, usually to their own benefit. In this week’s reading by Robin Brown, he explains the importance of presenting international events and how the flow of information is utilized. To do this, he uses the example of the “War on Terrorism” that took place after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

The author mentions that the United States has used three different paradigms in communicating the war on terrorism. These are: the Information Operations (IO) doctrine, which is “any effort to attack or defend the information necessary for the conduct of operations”; public diplomacy, which joins international broadcasting, cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and overseas information activities; and lastly, political news management, or otherwise known as the ‘spin’, which tries to persuade the public that one side of the truth is actually the reality of it. Brown then goes on to describe the flaws of each paradigm that leads to each one’s loss of effectiveness and credibility. For example, the influence of the IO doctrine in the situation with the Office of Strategic Influence at the Department of Defense (DoD) and its closure, because of the fear the DoD and the presidential communication staff felt of the possible lack of credibility.

Brown tells us that the framing of the war began just after the attacks of 9/11 when President Bush first used the phrase “winning the war against terrorism”, his choice of words eliminated other possible perceptions and considered the attacks the beginning of a war. A war entails a conflict between two parties and the continuous attacks between them until one wins. For me personally, Bush’s words of the war on terrorism were just a way to scare people into supporting a counterattack. At first it was a pretty abstract enemy, just terrorists in general, until suddenly the enemy had a name Al-Qaeda, and a face, Osama Bin Laden. Now it was more personal. Bin Laden on his part worked his media by framing the war not as a counterattack on terrorism, but that it was a war against Islam, a holy war. In this way he gained Muslim supporters. The US countered by saying, “Islam is peace”. This was a way to protect American Muslims, which were being attacked for no reason other than their religious affiliations and to challenge Al-Qaeda’s expressions.

The “War on Terror” manipulated the population in such a way, that people were truly scared of another attack and this made them support an actual war against the “enemy”, but it also made people obsessed to a point where any Arab looking person was attacked and accused of being a terrorist. Obviously, all this fanaticism has died down and now people are much less supportive of the war in Iraq, it’s pointless to continue being there; this supposed ‘war on terrorism’ ended years ago. And I’ll leave it at that, because I could probably go on and on for pages!

Ich bin ein Berliner

Having just returned from a year in Germany, I became especially intrigued when Hafez began sprinkling his article on International Reporting with references to German media coverage. (I was curious about his bio and discovered he is a professor in both Germany and the UK, hence his coverage of both systems of media.)

Hafez uses the example of the Olympics to show how media coverage tends to be nationalistic. While in Berlin, my first exposure to German television was watching the 2008 Olympics and we primarily watched coverage from the European channel Eurosport. Eurosport’s coverage focused on all European teams, thus it spent much more time covering a broad range of events and participants. In addition to using these events as an opportunity to learn my German numbers (score-keeping in German took on a whole new charm), it was intriguing to experience this “global” event from a non-American perspective.

Americans can’t be completely to blame for our focus on national events, however. In comparing coverage of international events by US, UK, and Germany outlets, the US was criticized for having the lowest percentage of coverage of international news. (While I do agree that international coverage in the US should be increased, the article failed to acknowledge that in terms of proximity, Germany calling many types of news “international” is in some ways like Michigan reporting on Ohio news.) Given the existence and growing prominence of the EU, much of this international news is incredibly relevant to Germans as well. And one has to start questioning to what extent German coverage of legislative developments in Brussels is really international anymore. The similarities to news reports, for example, in Kansas about federal decisions in Washington, DC are strong and increasing.

The Germans I came to know well were intensely proud of their familiarity with foreign news. Beyond being well-versed in foreign affairs, many Germans travel extensively and gain real exposure to cultures that are different from their own. One hesitates to belabor the point that part of this capacity to learn about other countries – and to travel to them – is the close proximity (and now close political integration) of many different countries, cultures, and languages.

It is important to note that patriotism is not something that is frequently found in Germany – at least not in the way common in the US. Even my peers in their mid-30s were extremely hesitant to exhibit any behavior that indicated a nationalistic attitude. This, perhaps, is key to how they approach the issues of other nations. In a constant effort to not re-live their past, they are committed (strongly, and vocally) to the pursuit of peace – and that requires knowing about what is happening in other places. Rallying around the flag? Trusting a leader unconditionally, especially when it comes to decisions of involvement in wars? Not in today’s Germany. In reading the discussions of Americans’ responses to 9/11 and the media’s call to “support our president unconditionally,” I could anticipate the virulent reaction my German friends would have had if exposed to such pleas.